We characterize trade policies that result from political competition when assessments of wellbeing include both material and psychosocial components. The material component re ‡ects, as usual, satisfaction from consumption. Borrowing from social identity theory, we take the psychosocial component as combining the pride and self-esteem an individual draws from the status of groups with which she identi…es and a dissonance cost she bears from identifying with those that are di¤erent from herself. In this framework, changes in social identi…cation patterns that may result, for example, from increased income inequality or heightened racial and ethnic tensions, lead to pronounced changes in trade policy. We analyze the nature of these policy changes.
Introduction
Gradual trade liberalization proceeded steadily throughout most of the post-war period. But recent years have witnessed a dramatic reversal of trade attitudes and trade policies in some countries.
What accounts for this sudden shift in the political winds?
Many theories of the political economy of trade policy point to the role of special interest groups in scoring protection for their members; see, for example, Helpman (2001, 2002) . But interest groups do not seem to have played a central role in recent events. In special interest politics, lobbyists seek preferential treatment for some industry or factor of production at the expense of others. The rhetoric of the recent policy reversals seems to be addressed to broader segments of the voting population, having as its apparent goal a repudiation of globalization and an across-the-board reduction in imports. E¤orts to understand the political economy of this aboutface might fruitfully focus on factors that led to changes in (some) voters'preferences rather than on changes in the behavior of interest groups.
In this paper, we explore the idea that voters'preferences over trade policy re ‡ect not only their material self-interests, but also the interests of members of those groups in society with whom they identify. As Shayo (2009) argues, voters often consider the interests of others when formulating their attitudes about redistributive policies, but such altruism typically is particular rather than universal. Individuals predominantly care about the well-being of those they perceive to be similar to themselves. In such a setting, discrete shifts in patterns of social identi…cation can result in precipitous changes in policy outcomes.
Social psychologists de…ne social identity as "the individual's knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value signi…cance to him of the group membership" (Tajfel, 1974, p.31) . Social identity theory builds on the assumption that society encompasses a variety of social categories that stand in power and status relation to one another (Hogg and Abrams, 1982, p.14) . The pertinent categories are history and context dependent and, to some extent, ‡uid (Hogg et al., 1995; Huddy, 2001) . They may include divisions along lines of nationality, race, ethnicity, class, occupation, gender, religion, and others, with di¤erent categorizations acquiring salience in di¤erent political, economic, and cultural environments. A key tenet of the social identity theory developed by Tajfel (1981) and Tajfel and Turner (1979) -and its close cousin, self-categorization theory as described by Turner et al. (1987) -is that individuals choose the categorical groups with which they associate based on the positive self-esteem they can derive from such a self-image and their sense of belonging to the group. Individuals need not be "accepted" into the groups with which they identify, nor need the other imagined members of an individual's identity group see themselves similarly. Rather, individuals compare themselves to a prototypical group member and derive satisfaction from the status that a group of others with similar social characteristics (along some dimension) enjoys in society. Kranton (2000, 2010) introduced identity into economics. They posited a utility function that includes not only the consumption of goods and services but also a psychosocial component of self-image. Self-esteem, they assumed is enhanced when an individual conforms to the behavioral norms prescribed for their self-imagined social groups. Our approach builds on theirs, and especially on Shayo's (2009) formulation that incorporates a perceived utility gain when an individual identi…es with a group that enjoys high status but a loss from identifying with a group whose prototypical member is very di¤erent from that person along relevant dimensions. In his paper on redistributive taxation, Shayo advances the notion of a "social identity equilibrium," in which individuals self-categorize among a set of salient identity groups as a function of the behaviors and outcomes of others, where behavior and outcomes are induced by policies and the policy environment in turn re ‡ects the identity choices made by the individuals together with their political and economic actions. We will adopt a conceptually similar notion of equilibrium when thinking about the formation of trade policies, even if our model di¤ers from his in various details.
We begin our analysis with a simple economic environment familiar from the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model. There are two factors of production in a small country, more-skilled labor and lessskilled labor, and two goods, an export good and an import-competing good. The country imports the good that uses less-skilled labor relatively intensively at given world prices. The more-skilled individuals constitute the upper echelon in society and account for a minority of the population.
They may self-identify as "elite" or "upper-class," or whatever term aptly describes a group of highly-educated and well-paid individuals. The less-skilled majority comprises the "working class" and these individuals too may identify with the fellow members of their social class, deeming themselves to be, for example, "Main Streeters"or "middle class." 1 In addition, and non-exclusively, individuals of either skill group may choose to identify with the nation as a whole; in the U.S. context, for example, this would mean seeing oneself as an "American." 2 We follow Shayo (2009) in assuming that the psychological bene…t to an individual from identifying with a group is increasing in the perceived status of the group, which we take to be the material well-being of the average group member. 3 The psychological cost of identi…cation is increasing in the di¤erence between an individual's own economic and cultural characteristics and that of the prototypical or average member of the group, re ‡ecting the assumption that identifying with others who are di¤erent from oneself creates cognitive dissonance (see Turner et al., 1987; Hogg, 1996; Hogg and Hains, 1996;  and McGarty et al., 1992) .
The polity chooses an ad valorem tari¤ on the import good. We imagine in the background a political environment such as the one described by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , Dixit and Londregan (1996) , and Helpman (1996, 2001) . In this setting, there are two political parties that di¤er in their ideological stances. Voters are heterogeneous in their preferences for the two parties. The parties use their trade-policy positions to compete for votes. An individual votes for a party if and only if her preference for its trade platform outweighs her preference for the ideological position of the rival party. The equilibrium in this political game features convergence for instrumental policies such as tari¤s. Moreover, if the parties view all groups of voters as having ideological preferences drawn from a common distribution, then the equilibrium policy is that which maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function. With this model in the back of our minds, we seek to identify the tari¤ that achieves the utilitarian optimum. However, in summing utilities across the polity, we incorporate not only the components of welfare that measure individuals'material well-being, but also those that measure the psychological satisfaction they derive from their chosen social identi…cations. 4 Our goal is to characterize how trade policy outcomes re ‡ect the economic, political and cultural environment. To that end, we de…ne an identi…cation regime to be a complete description of the pattern of social identi…cation; i.e., a list of all of the groups with which each individual identi…es.
In our simple model with two types of individuals distinguished only by their skill levels, there are a limited number of possible regimes. More-skilled individuals might identify or not as members of the society's elite social group and they might identify or not with the nation as a whole. Similarly, the less-skilled individuals might see themselves as members of the working class, or as nationals, or neither, or both. Typically, a small change in some parameter will not induce a change in identi…cation regime. Nonetheless, it may generate a change in the equilibrium policy, unlike what happens when the psychosocial components of utility are absent. For example, we …nd that when every individual identi…es with her own social class and the members of at least one skill group also identify with the nation, then neutral technological progress that does not alter the identi…cation regime results in an increase in the rate of protection. This result runs counter to what happens when social identi…cation is absent, in which case the utilitarian optimum for a small country always manifests free trade.
But we are especially interested in situations when a change in the political or economic environment alters the identi…cation regime. In keeping with recent political history, we focus speci…cally on "populism." In his well-regarded book, Müller (2016) de…nes populism succinctly as a speci…c form of identity politics in which a group of voters rejects the elite members of society's claims to moral legitimacy. By his de…nition, "populists do not just criticize elites; they also claim that they and only they represent the true people" (Müller, 2016, p.40) . Populists advocate policies that (in their minds) rightfully neglect the interests of the "corrupt" segments of society while serving instead the interests of "real" people. Many commentators see the rise in populism as one of the critical developments in recent European and American political history.
To capture a dramatic rise in populism in the context of our model, we posit an initial identi…cation regime in which less-skilled workers identify not only as "working class,"but also as members of a national group that includes all denizens of the country. Following a populist revolution, the identi…cation regime changes. In the event, the less-skilled cease to identify with the nation, or at least with their former understanding of "the nation" that included the elites. Instead, they see the nation as synonymous with their own class and type. We describe the parameter changes in the model that can give rise to such a change in identi…cation regime and study the implications for the equilibrium trade policy. Interestingly, we …nd that if the elite comprise a su¢ ciently small fraction of the nation's population, a populist revolution of this sort must result in a discrete jump in the equilibrium tari¤ rate.
The rise in populism is not the only important trend in western politics. Commentators agree that race (in the United States) and ethnicity (in Europe) became notably more salient in recent political discourse. To study this change and to consider whether it might have played any role in a shift in trade policy preferences, we must extend our simple model to include more dimensions of identi…cation and more factors of production. In Section 7, we allow for three types of labor, with low, middle, and high skill levels. The middle-skilled and high-skilled workers produce two traded goods, as before, with the import-competing good again making intensive use of the lesserskilled labor. Low-skilled labor, on the other hand, is the unique input for nontraded services. This trichotomy captures the apparent reality that the least skilled in society typically do not produce the manufactured goods that compete with imports, but rather are employed predominantly in the service sector. Meanwhile, we distinguish two racial or ethnic groups, to which we refer as the "majority" and the "minority." These categories have no direct economic relevance, inasmuch as a worker with majority race or ethnicity is assumed to be a perfect substitute for a worker with minority race or ethnicity of the same skill level.
In this section, we allow for a wide variety of identi…cation regimes. Individuals are characterized by their race or ethnicity and by their skill level. Each may identify with her own social class independent of race or ethnicity, with her own racial or ethnic group, independent of income level, and with a narrower group that includes only those of the same race or ethnicity and the same social class. In addition, anyone can identify with the nation, the broadest group that includes all denizens of the country. We model an increase in the salience of race and ethnicity in political deliberations as an increase in the parameter that measures the psychological cost that an individual bears when identifying with others of the opposite race or ethnicity. We show that such changes in the salience of race and ethnicity have no e¤ect on trade policy when the identi…cation regime remains the same. But we do …nd circumstances in which increases in racial and ethnic sensitivity generate discretely higher tari¤s when segments of the population identify more narrowly than before.
Our goal in the paper is not to prove that certain changes in identity have been responsible for recent shifts in trade attitudes and trade policies. Such shifts, after all, are not well established.
Rather, we aim to show that aspects of social identity can readily be incorporated in models of the political economy of trade policy. When this is done, changes in patterns of social identi…cation can alter preferences about trade policy, both among particular groups in society and in the aggregate. Moreover, inasmuch as identity politics builds on a dichotomous distinction between "in-groups"and "out-groups,"the policy response to changes in social identi…cation can be sudden and dramatic.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce social identity as a component in individuals'utility that in ‡uences their voting behavior. In Section 3, we identify the tari¤ that maximizes a utilitarian social-welfare function and argue that protectionist outcomes can occur in situations in which free trade would prevail absent the psychosocial components of individual utility. Section 4 addresses how small changes in the economic, political and cultural environment a¤ect trade policy when the patterns of social identi…cation remain …xed.
In Section 5, we consider the policy e¤ects of shifts in the identi…cation regime and, in particular, those of a populist revolution in which the working class repudiates its identi…cation with a broad national group that includes the elites. A brief Section 6 examines the robustness of our results to changes in the political maximand, in particular substituting the welfare of the median voter for that of the average voter. Finally, in Section 7, we extend the model to include additional categories in society that enable a richer pattern of social identi…cation. Speci…cally, we introduce a distinction between an ethnic majority and an ethnic minority and allow individuals to identify with their social class and their ethnic group. Here we study the trade-policy implications of an intensi…cation of ethnic divisions that leads some individuals to identify more narrowly than before. Section 8 concludes.
A Model of Social Identity in Trade Politics
We consider a simple and familiar trading environment. A small country produces and trades two goods at …xed world prices. The goods are produced competitively, with constant returns to scale, by two types of individuals: the "more-skilled," h, and the "less-skilled,"`. (Later we will introduce a third type of labor that earns even less than type`; these workers will be employed in a sector that produces nontraded services.) The less-skilled workers comprise a majority of the population, so that `> h , where i is the fraction of individuals of type i. The export good, X, makes relatively intensive use of the more-skilled labor, while the import-competing good, Z;
makes relatively intensive use of the less-skilled labor. We normalize the size of the population to one.
All individuals irrespective of skill level share the same, quasi-linear materialistic utility function,
is the material utility enjoyed by a representative individual with skill level i who consumes quantity c Xi of the export good and quantity c Zi of the import-competing good. The quasi-linear form allows us to ignore income e¤ects, which are not particularly germane to the analysis, but are analytically cumbersome. We assume that v ( ) is increasing and concave.
An individual's overall ful…llment comprises the sum of her material utility, as just described, and a psychosocial component that comes from identifying with those groups in society that have emotional signi…cance to her. Psychosocial utility has two subcomponents, one positive and one negative. On the one hand, an individual takes pride in seeing herself as a member of a group, the more so the greater is the "status" of that group in its social context. According to Tajfel's (1974) social identity theory, identifying with a group of others confers dignity and self-respect.
On the other hand, there is cognitive dissonance that ensues from identifying with others who are very di¤erent from oneself. Self-assurance derives from seeing oneself as fundamentally similar in relevant ways to those others whom one respects. In contrast, seeing oneself as a member of a group whose others are very di¤erent may undermine an individual's con…dence in her attributes and behavior.
We take the bene…t to any individual from identifying with some group to be a linearly increasing function of the status of the average member of that group, where status is measured by material well-being. The dissonance cost is an increasing, quadratic function of the distance in some conceptual space between an individual's own attributes and those of the average member of a group with whom she identi…es. Since the social groups that we will consider in this section are de…ned in socioeconomic terms, we measure distance also in units of material well-being; that is, an individual bears a greater cost from identifying with a group of others who are, on average, much wealthier or much poorer than she. Combining these two components, we have that a representative individual with skill level i who chooses to self-identify with a socioeconomic group g gains a net bene…t from that identi…cation of
where A g i is a constant re ‡ecting the baseline level of pride that comes from identifying with group g for an individual of type i and g is the average material utility of all those who are considered by society as having the characteristics that de…ne group g. In principle, A g i could be negative, if individuals perceive a stigma from identifying with a group of su¢ ciently low status. The parameter g i can be thought to represent the intensity of identi…cation with group g among those with skill level i; Huddy (2001, p. 137), for example, has emphasized variation in the degree to which di¤erent types of individuals identify with di¤erent salient groups and the importance of this consideration for political outcomes.
Two comments are in order. First, as stressed in the self-categorization theory developed by Turner et al. (1987) , identi…cation is voluntary and unregulated; it is a choice made by the individual and its psychological signi…cance resides only in that person's own mind. An individual does not need anyone's permission to identify in any particular way, nor is she required to identify with groups that share her salient characteristics.
Second, the set of groups with whom an individual may identify and the attributes of the prototypical members of those groups are given at a moment in time by the cultural and historical context. That is, we take the de…ning characteristics of group g as exogenous (although they may change over time in response to political and historical events) when we calculate the average characteristic in the group, g in equation (2); in particular, g does not depend on the set of individuals that choose to identify with group g. While it would be interesting to consider how the set of social groups that are salient in a society evolves over time, as well as the determinants of a group's de…ning characteristics, that is beyond the scope of the present paper.
To summarize, a representative individual in skill-group i has preferences that are summarized by the utility function u i , where
if the individual self-identi…es with group g and I g i = 0 if not, and where G is the set of social groups that is salient in society at that historical juncture. In this section, we take the set of salient social identity groups to have three elements: (i) a socioeconomic group that we term "the elite" and designate by " that has as its archetype one of the higher-earning individuals in society, so that " = h , i.e., the material utility of the representative more-skilled individual; (ii) a socioeconomic group that we term "the working-class" and designate by ! that has as its archetype one of the lower-earning individuals in society, so that ! = `, i.e., the material utility of the representative less-skilled individual; and (iii) a social group that we term "the nation" and designate by n that has as its archetype the average citizen in the country, so that n = ` `+ h h . It follows that
To avoid a taxonomy that includes unrealistic cases, we introduce parameter restrictions that rule out certain identi…cation patterns. First, we shall assume throughout that A " h > 0 and A ! > 0; each individual takes some pride from identifying with others in their own social class. Then, since h = " and `= ! , every individual chooses to identify with her own socioeconomic group, because such identi…cation confers a psychological bene…t but imposes no dissonance cost. Second, we assume that ! h and " are large enough that no cross-class identi…cation occurs; i.e., no moreskilled individual identi…es as working class and no less-skilled individual identi…es as an elite. 5 We are left with two possible outcomes for each skill type: in addition to self-identifying as elite, the more-skilled individuals might opt to identify with the nation or not (I n h = 1 or I n h = 0); and similarly, in addition to self-identifying as working class, the less-skilled individuals might choose to identify with the nation or not (I ǹ = 1 or I ǹ = 0). In total, there are four possible identi…cation regimes, R= f(0; 0) ; (0; 1) ; (1; 0) ; (1; 1)g ; where an identi…cation regime r 2 R is an ordered pair in which the …rst element describes whether or not the more-skilled individuals identify with the nation and the second element describes whether or not the less-skilled individuals identify with the nation.
We also introduce a symmetry assumption that sharpens some of our results. In particular, we invoke 5 Equivalently, we could assume that A ! h and A " are zero or small, so that the more-skilled individuals take little or no pride in identifying as working class and the less-skilled individuals take no pride in pretending to be elites.
With this assumption of symmetric bene…ts from status, those that are more skilled take the same pride from a marginal increase in the status of the elites as those that are less skilled take from a marginal increase in the status of the working class. Moreover, if the two skill groups both identify as nationals, then those in each group take similar pleasure from a marginal increase in the status of the nation.
We turn next to the political environment. As we mentioned in the introduction, we have in mind a political setting such as that described in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , Dixit and Londregan (1996) , and Helpman (1996, 2001) . In these papers, two political parties distinguished by their ideological stances compete for votes by announcing their intentions for a set of pliable policies. The parties adopt policy platforms to maximize their expected vote counts, anticipating that individuals will cast their votes for whichever party o¤ers a more agreeable combination of ideological and pliable policies. Rather than describe this game in detail, we apply what we know from the earlier papers. In particular, all of these authors have shown that if voters' ideological preferences are drawn from a common distribution, then the parties' positions on the pliable policy issues converge on those that maximize the sum of voters'utilities.
To focus on endogenous rates of protection, we take the pliable policy instrument to be an ad valorem tari¤ at rate t. The small country faces a …xed relative price, q, of imports in terms of exports. Then the domestic relative price of the import-competing good is the product of the world price and one plus the tari¤ rate, or p = q (1 + t) .
We seek to characterize the tari¤ rate t that maximizes the sum of voters'utilities. Importantly, in a setting of identity politics, the utility level that in ‡uences an individual's voting behavior includes not only the material component of well-being, but also the psychological component associated with self-esteem. In other words, the utilitarian welfare function of interest here is P i i u i , not the more usual and limited version, P i i . 6 The domestic price determines output levels, Y X (p) and Y Z (p), as well as factor prices, w h (p) and w`(p), as in any model with a Heckscher-Ohlin production structure. Speci…cally, factor prices in units of the numeraire good X are such that the domestic price in each sector equals the unit cost of production. And given factor prices, which dictate the cost minimizing production techniques, output levels are such as to clear the two labor markets. Recall, as well, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that applies in this environment; an increase in the relative price p boosts the wage of less-skilled workers more than proportionately, while depressing the real wage of the more-skilled workers. These distributional implications of tari¤-induced price changes will …gure prominently in the analysis below. 6 The mechanisms by which social identity a¤ects trade policy are present for a wide set of political environments that imply di¤erent mappings from voter preferences to policy outcome. We show in Section 6, for example, that the e¤ects of a populist revolution are qualitatively similar no matter whether the policy outcome maximizes utilitarian welfare or the welfare of the median voter.
We develop now the political maximand, U . An individual in skill group i earns a wage w i (p) and receives a share of the rebated tari¤ revenues,
is the common per capita surplus from consumption of good Z.
The psychosocial component of utility for an individual in skill group h is
which is the sum of the self-worth she reaps by identifying with other elites and the net bene…t from identifying with other nationals, if in fact she elects to do so. Notice that we write I n h (p) to emphasize the fact that a more-skilled individual's decision whether to identify with the nation depends on the domestic relative price which in turn determines her own income level and that of the national average. Similarly, the psychosocial component of utility for an individual in skill
she gains psychological rewards from identifying with her fellow members of the working class and possibly by identifying with the nation.
In a competitive economy,
is aggregate GDP at domestic prices. Also, average material utility is a population-weighted average of the material utility of individuals in each skill group; i.e., n (p; q) = h w h (p) + `w`( p) + T (p; q) + (p). Using these observations, and summing across all voters, we have under Assumption 1 that
where (p) w h (p) w`(p) > 0 is the earnings gap between more-and less-skilled workers. The …rst line on the right-hand side of (7) is aggregate welfare from all material utilities and from individuals' identi…cation with their own social class. The following two lines give the aggregate psychological gain to the more-and less-skilled individuals, respectively, from identifying as nationals, if members of those skill groups choose to do so.
We o¤er two observations about the political maximand, U (p; q). First, when all individuals identify with their own social class, this introduces an additional element of class warfare to the political struggle over trade policies. Not only does a less-skilled worker favor an import tari¤ to boost her own wage, but she also favors protection to bene…t others like herself. Similar, a more-skilled individual opposes protection not only to preserve her own pay, but also to safeguard the incomes of other elites with whom she identi…es. However, under the symmetry assumption, these sel…sh motives for trade policy balance one another in the calculus of utilitarian Second, when either skill group identi…es with the nation as a whole, this introduces a source of inequality aversion into the trade politics. Here, such a distaste for inequality does not re ‡ect a sense of fairness or altruism on the part of any voter. Rather, inasmuch as everyone pays a psychological toll from identifying with others that are di¤erent from themselves, those that identify with the nation sel…shly lean to policies that narrow the gap between themselves and the average. In the present context, a tari¤ has such an e¤ect, inasmuch as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem ties the relative wage of less-skilled workers to the price of the import-competing good.
Equilibrium Protection with Social Identi…cation
In this section, we maximize the utilitarian objective function, U (p; q), in order to characterize the equilibrium tari¤. We describe the conditions under which the trade politics with social identi…cation give rise to protectionist outcomes and discuss how the equilibrium tari¤ rate responds to changes in social attitudes, technology, and the terms of trade for a given identi…cation regime. We postpone consideration of changes in patterns of identi…cation until the next section.
Let us suppose …rst that neither the more-skilled individuals nor the less-skilled individuals identify with the broader nation; i.e., I n h = 0 and
, and the equilibrium trade policy is the one that maximizes aggregate material welfare, Y (p) + T (p; q) + (p). For a small country, this policy is free trade.
The unskilled workers favor tari¤s up to a point, both for their own real-income gains and in order to advance the status of the working class with whom they identify. The skilled workers oppose protection (and favor import subsidies), also to further their sel…sh interests and those of the elite with whom they identify. When the politics lead to a utilitarian maximum, the o¤setting interests cancel and the outcome is a neutral stance with respect to trade. Now suppose that the high-skilled workers identify with the nation, but the low-skilled workers do not; i.e., I n h = 1 and I ǹ = 0. Then the political maximand comprises the …rst-two lines in (7) . In addition to constants, the maximand includes a component that is proportional to aggregate material welfare and a component that is decreasing in the wage gap, . The latter re ‡ects the psychological cost to the more-skilled workers from identifying with nationals who are di¤erent from themselves in terms of socioeconomic standing. As we noted before, the dissonance costs induce an aversion to inequality on the part of these elites. Since a marginal change in the tari¤ has a negligible a¤ect on aggregate material welfare at t = 0, and since a tari¤ reduces the wage gap via the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism, the maximization of U (p; q) generates a positive tari¤ in this case, as long as n h > 0. The logic is similar if the low-skilled workers identify with the nation but the high-skilled workers do not; i.e., I n h = 0 and I ǹ = 1. Then the sel…sh motives of the working class and elite cancel, but the low-skilled individuals have an additional interest in protection in order to reduce the psychological distance between themselves and the average national. In this case, too, the political maximand is increasing at t = 0, because the only force that does not cancel there is the low-skilled workers' aversion to being di¤erent from the prototype.
Finally, if identi…cation with the nation is widespread among both skill groups, the aggregate aversion to inequality is all the greater. Members of both classes can mitigate their dissonance cost by narrowing the income gap between themselves and the average. This does not mean that both skill groups favor tari¤s; in fact, the high-skilled individuals may well prefer an import subsidy to further their own material interests and to boost the status of the elites with whom they identify.
But the sel…sh interests of the high-skilled workers balance those of the low-skilled workers at t = 0, leaving a net preference for protection. We recap these …ndings in 8 Proposition 1 Suppose that n h > 0 and ǹ > 0. If neither skill group identi…es with the nation, the equilibrium tari¤ is zero. Otherwise, it is positive.
Comparative Statics in a Fixed Identi…cation Regime
We ask next how small changes in the economic and political environment a¤ect the equilibrium policy when the identi…cation pattern does not change. That is, we begin from an equilibrium in which the equilibrium policy is some t o and the identi…cation regime is some r 2 R: We then change one of the parameters of the model by a small amount, such that the equilibrium identi…cation regime continues to be r , and examine the response of t. We consider in turn changes in the psychological cost of identi…cation, g i , changes in the production technologies (as described further below), and changes in the terms of trade, q. In each case, we employ the usual method of comparative statics: we calculate the shift in the marginal bene…t from a tari¤, evaluated at t = t o , and rely on the second-order condition for an optimum to tell us in which direction the equilibrium tari¤ must adjust. From (3) we have that the marginal political bene…t from an increase in the tari¤ rate, t, is equal to qU p (p; q), and then from (4) and (7),
Considering the second-order condition that requires U pp (p ; q) < 0 at the global maximum of U (p; q), the equilibrium tari¤ rises in response to a small increase in the parameter if and only if dU p (p; q) =d > 0. 9
Note that we need only consider initial regimes in which at least one of the skill groups identi…es with the nation, because if neither do so, the equilibrium tari¤ remains unchanged at its initial level of zero.
Changes in the Psychological Cost of Identi…cation
First note that a change in the cost of identifying with one's own social class has no e¤ect on the equilibrium policy. In our model with homogeneous skill groups, individuals bear no dissonance cost from identifying with the others just like them, no matter how large is " h or ! . So, we need only consider changes in n h and ǹ . Suppose, then, that I n i = 1 for i = h or i =`, and that n i grows. That is, it becomes psychologically more costly for the members of skill group i to identify with others in their country that have a di¤erent standard of living from their own. At the initial equilibrium, this raises the marginal political value of a tari¤, because a tari¤ reduces the income gap, , via the Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect. Therefore, we have Proposition 2 Suppose that skill group i identi…es with the nation in some initial political equilibrium (I n i = 1) and that a change in the cost of identi…cation does not induce a change in the identi…cation regime. Then an increase in n i generates an increase in the equilibrium tari¤ rate, for i = h or i =`.
Changes in Technology
We model technological change that is factor-augmenting. That is, we take the productivity of one unit of "raw"labor of type i to be i in all uses, and consider changes in i .
where o i is the initial productivity level for skill group i, then we have Hicks-neutral technological 9 Recall the last footnote in which we argued that a global maximum for U (p; q) always exists.
progress throughout the economy. 10 If d h = o h > d `= ò 0, then the productivity gains are biased toward the more-skilled labor. Without further loss of generality, we can set the initial productivity levels equal to one; i.e., o h = ò = 1. We can also de…ne such that d h = d `; then technological progress is skill-biased if > 1 and Hicks-neutral if = 1:
Hicks-neutral or skill-biased technological progress can have o¤setting e¤ects on the marginal political desirability of a tari¤. On the one hand, technological progress of this sort widens the wage gap, and inasmuch as the psychological cost of distance is a convex function of the gap, it increases the marginal desirability of a tari¤ to alleviate dissonance. But technological progress often will increase the marginal cost of a tari¤ in terms of aggregate material welfare and the status bene…ts of identi…cation that derive therefrom. This tends to reduce the desirability of a given rate of protection. Despite this apparent ambiguity, we …nd that dU p (p; q) = d `j d h = d `> 0 when = 1; i.e., when productivity gains are Hicks-neutral, the upward pressure on the tari¤ from the increased marginal dissonance cost always outweighs any downward pressure on the tari¤ from a possible increase in the marginal e¢ ciency cost. The proof in the appendix relies on the fact that the initial tari¤ rate is not arbitrary, but involves an optimal weighting of the e¤ects of protection on national income versus the cost of dissonance. Using the …rst-order condition for maximizing When > 1, the political outcome is, in principle, ambiguous. Yet, we can derive su¢ cient conditions for the tari¤ rate to increase in response to skill-biased technical progress. First, the tari¤ necessarily rises if w 00 h (p ) 0. This condition, is satis…ed, for example, if the production technologies in both sectors are Leontief, in which case w h (p) is linear and w 00 h (p ) = 0. Second, the tari¤ rises if both w 00 h (p ) > 0 and w 00 (p ) > 0. This condition is satis…ed, for example, if both sectors produce with Cobb-Douglas technologies. We emphasize that these conditions are su¢ cient for a tari¤ hike, but not necessary; skill-biased technical progress induces an increase in trade protection in many other cases as well.
We summarize our …ndings in Proposition 3 Suppose that at least one skill group identi…es with the nation in an initial political equilibrium and that a change in technology does not induce a change in the identi…cation regime.
Then Hicks-neutral ( = 1) technical progress generates an increase in the equilibrium tari¤ rate.
Skill-biased technical progress ( > 1) increases the tari¤ rate if either (i) w 00 h (p ) 0 or (ii) w 00 h (p ) 0 and w 00 (p ) 0.
Changes in the Terms of Trade
We now consider changes in the terms of trade. Of course, improvements in the terms of trade stemming from the "China Shock" and from growth in other emerging economies have been a prominent feature of the recent European and American economic experiences (see, for example, Autor et al., 2013) .
Suppose the terms of trade improve, i.e., dq < 0. From (8), it is clear that
For a given domestic price, an improved terms of trade means more tari¤ revenue per unit of imports and so a domestic price hike that chokes o¤ imports has a greater adverse e¤ect on national income.
Meanwhile, at a given domestic price, an improvement in the terms of trade has no impact on the wage gap and thus on the aggregate dissonance costs. It follows that an improvement in the terms of trade unambiguously reduces the marginal political gain from increasing the domestic price at p = p . At least part of any fall in the world price of imports will be passed through to domestic prices after the optimal tari¤ response.
But this does not tell us what happens to the tari¤ rate. The domestic price might fall by proportionately less than the terms of trade, which would imply an increase in the rate of protection.
Or the price might fall by proportionately more than the terms of trade, which would imply a cut in the tari¤ rate. To determine which of these outcomes obtains, we must examine the extent of the decline in the price that maximizes the political objective, U (p; q), in response to a change in q. We undertake this calculation in the appendix and prove 
The …rst term on the left-hand side of (9) captures changes in the slope of the import-demand curve. If 00 (p ) < 0, the slope of import demand becomes ‡atter as the domestic price declines, in which case the marginal e¢ ciency cost of the tari¤ grows. On its own, this would tend to increase the equilibrium tari¤ rate. The next two terms capture the e¤ect of a terms of trade change on the marginal dissonance cost due to inequality. If the sum of these terms is negative, the marginal bene…t of a tari¤ from reducing the wage gap becomes greater as the terms of trade improve. This also contributes to a higher politically-optimal tari¤ rate. The direction of change in t re ‡ects the combination of these e¤ects. Since the second term on the left-hand side is negative by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, a su¢ cient condition for a tari¤ hike in response to a terms of trade improvement is 00 (p ) 0 and 00 (p ) 0; this condition is satis…ed, for example, when both goods have Leontief production technologies and consumer demand for this good is linear or concave.
In the last section, we studied the e¤ects of small changes in the economic and political environment that do not alter the identi…cation regime. We found that changes in the psychological costs of identi…cation, changes in technology, and changes in the terms of trade all generate political adjustments in the equilibrium tari¤ rate whenever the members of at least one skill group identify broadly with the nation. Naturally, such e¤ects are proportionate to the magnitude of the shifts in the underlying parameters, so they typically imply a smooth and gradual evolution of trade policy.
In this section, we consider shifts in the underlying environment that induce changes in the identi…cation regime. Prompted by recent political events, we focus on a particular switch in the pattern of self-identi…cation, namely one that we term a populist revolution. 11 Populism has been de…ned by Müller (2016) as a political situation in which a group of voters rejects the legitimacy of the political and economic elite and designates themselves as the only "true" citizens worthy of consideration in policy deliberations. Müller describes populism as "always a form of identity politics," but observes that "not all versions of identity politics are populist" (p.3). As in all expressions of self-identity, populists distinguish an "in-group"and an "out-group,"but populism is distinguished by the composition of these groups; the in-group comprises the working man whereas the out-group is made up of allegedly corrupt elites.
To capture the phenomenon of populist revolution, we begin with an initial identi…cation regime in which all members of society see themselves a part of the broader nation, in addition to identifying with their own socioeconomic group. The "revolution" then entails a repudiation of the elites by the working class. When the working class rejects the legitimacy of the elites, they re-de…ne what it means to be a national so as to exclude this group. In short, we imagine a change in identi…cation regime whereby I ǹ = 1 beforehand and I ǹ = 0 afterward. In our model, such a change in self-identi…cation could be caused by an increase in ǹ , the dissonance cost of associating with those in a di¤erent socioeconomic class, by skill-biased or Hicks-neutral technological progress that increases the wage gap and therefore the cost of identi…cation, or by a terms of trade improvement that does likewise. Arguably, all of these trends have been observed in the period leading up to the recent rise in populist expression.
Consider how the equilibrium tari¤ adjusts following a populist revolution. 12 Beforehand, the equilibrium policy is determined by the …rst-order condition
Afterward, the equilibrium policy is determined instead by
The ex post domestic price,p , will be discretely higher than the ex ante price, p , if
The price will be discretely lower if the inequality runs in the opposite direction. And, if it happens that U p (p ; q)j I n h =1; I ǹ =0 = U p (p ; q)j I n h =I ǹ =1 , then the change in identi…cation regime has no e¤ect on the policy outcome.
Equations (10) and (11) 
Notice that (12) is satis…ed for h = 0 and is violated for h = 1. Notice too that the left-hand side is decreasing in h and the right-hand side is increasing in h for all h < 1. This implies the existence of a h 2 (0; 1) such that a populist revolution induces an upward jump in protection for all h < h . If n h = ǹ , h can be expressed quite simply as h = n = (2 n + 1 + ). When the working class ceases to identify with a broad group that includes the elites, the political pressures for protection may intensify or abate. On the one hand, the working class no longer reaps psychological gains from the status associated with national income. On the other hand, they no longer bear dissonance costs from the wage gap. In other words, the working class perceives protection as being less costly, but also as less valuable for its redistributive e¤ects. The tari¤ rate rises whenever the former force outweighs the latter, as it will if most of the other citizens are in the same social class as themselves; i.e., if `i s large and h is small. For example, if n h = ǹ = n and = n = 0:1, the tari¤ rate jumps when the elite are less than 1=13 7:7% of the population.
We summarize our …ndings in
Proposition 5 There exists a h 2 (0; 1) such that a populist revolution in which less-skilled individuals cease to identify with the nation induces a discrete upward jump in the tari¤ rate for all h < h and a discrete downward jump in the tari¤ rate for all h > h . If n h = ǹ = n , h = n = (2 n + 1 + ).
Evidently, a change in identi…cation regime can generate a precipitous change in trade policy.
In particular, a populist revolution can generate a discontinuous jump in tari¤ rates. Whether the jump is upward or downward depends on the size of the elite. The revolution that provokes a discrete change in protectionism might be caused by economic factors, such as an increase in income inequality owing to skill-biased technical change or the forces of globalization, or by political factors, as when entrepreneurial politicians stoke up anti-elite sentiments among the working class in order to promote their own political ends.
Before extending our analysis to include additional identi…cation categories, we discuss brie ‡y an alternative political environment. Until now, we have assumed that protectionist policies re ‡ect the preferences of the average voter, as suggested by the aforementioned models of probabilistic voting. In this section, we revisit our conclusions in a setting in which tari¤s maximize instead the welfare of the median voter.
Inasmuch as the less-skilled individuals constitute a majority of the voting population, the median voter is a member of the working class. The new political objective becomes
which combines the median voter's own material welfare, the self-esteem she gains from identifying with her socioeconomic class, and a net psychological bene…t she may reap from identifying with the nation. The marginal political bene…t from a tari¤ hike in this setting is qU med
Here, social identi…cation by the more-skilled workers makes no di¤erence for policy; only the identity choices made by the median voter matter. Since the less-skilled individuals always identify with the working class, there are only two possible identi…cation regimes to consider:
either I ǹ (p) = 1 or I ǹ (p) = 0: In either case, U med p (q; q) > 0; i.e., the median voter's welfare rises when the tari¤ rate is increased from zero. 13 A small tari¤ has negligible cost in terms of aggregate national income, but it increases the wages of the less-skilled individuals and narrows the wage gap. Whether the less-skilled workers identify with the nation or not, the median voter prefers some protection for the import-competing sector. The political equilibrium always entails a positive tari¤, which we denote by t med > 0. 14 Now suppose that ǹ rises; i.e., the less-skilled individuals become more sensitive to identifying with others who have achieved greater economic status than themselves. Clearly, if the less-skilled individuals do not identify with the nation, this has no e¤ect on the equilibrium policy. If they do identify with the nation both beforehand and afterward, the marginal bene…t of a tari¤ increases, because a tari¤ serves to narrow the wage gap and reduces dissonance costs. It follows that @t med =@ ǹ = 0 if I ǹ = 0 and @t med =@ ǹ > 0 if I ǹ = 1.
Turning to the e¤ects of technical progress, we …nd that the tari¤ preferred by the median voter-like that preferred by the average voter-rises in response to Hicks-neutral productivity gains that do not alter the identi…cation regime. Moreover, t med rises in response to skill-biased 1 3 Also note that U med p (p; q) 0 for all p q. 1 4 This …nding mimics that of Mayer (1984) , who showed that positive protection emerges in a median-voter framework when households di¤er in their endowments of capital and labor and the median household has relatively less capital than the average. technological progress whenever w 00 h (p) 0. However, as with the utilitarian objective function that we considered in Section 4.2, the tari¤ that maximizes the welfare of the median voter may rise or fall in response to skill-biased technological progress when w 00 h (p) > 0. 15 If the terms of trade improve, the tari¤ preferred by the median voter will likely change, for two reasons. First, the marginal e¢ ciency cost of the tari¤ will grow or shrink according to whether the import demand curve becomes ‡atter or steeper. The median voter shares in this marginal cost or bene…t of protection as a claimant on rebated tari¤ revenues, and from the status that derives therefrom. Second, the marginal redistribution brought about by a tari¤ will change, inasmuch as the Stolper-Samuelson derivatives adjust. This a¤ects the median voter directly, as a recipient of less-skilled wages, and may also alter any dissonance cost she bears from achieving a lesser socioeconomic status than the average national.
In the appendix we show that the median voter's preferred tari¤ rate rises if and only if
The form of this inequality is strikingly similar to that in (9) , which governs the direction of tari¤ adjustment to a terms-of-trade improvement in a political environment with aggregate welfare maximization. The di¤erence comes from the weight on the middle elasticity, which is now zero in case the less-skilled workers fail to identify with the nation and less than one even if they do so.
Since 0 (p ) < 0, this inequality is less likely to be satis…ed when the median voter's preferences dictate the equilibrium rate of protection compared to when the average voter's preferences do so.
Finally, we reconsider the e¤ects of a populist revolution, this time in a median-voter setting.
First note that the equilibrium tari¤ under either I ǹ (p) = 1 or I ǹ (p) = 0 might be prohibitive.
An increase in the rate of protection from any given level always raises the real income of the lessskilled workers via the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism, it always raises the status of the less-skilled workers, and it always narrows the wage gap. The only adverse e¤ect comes from a reduction in tari¤ revenue, and this can happen only for tari¤s on the downward-sloping portion of the La¤er curve (which can emerge in the political equilibrium).
We suppose, nonetheless, that the equilibrium tari¤s before and after the populist revolution are interior; i.e., they do not eliminate imports. Then these tari¤s are determined by a pair of …rst-order conditions of the form U med p (p; q) = 0, one with I ǹ = 1 and the other with I ǹ = 0. As before, we calculate the di¤erence in the marginal bene…t of a tari¤ in the two regimes, evaluated at p = p , the equilibrium tari¤ before the less-skilled individuals repudiate their identi…cation with the broad group that includes the elite. We …nd
The rate of protection jumps upward in this case if n > 2 ǹ h (p ), and it jumps downward if the inequality runs in the opposite direction. Once again, a populist revolution generates a discrete rise in protection when the elite comprises a small enough fraction of the voting population.
Ethnic and Racial Identi…cation
Until now, we have focused on a political environment in which there are only two groups in society, a group of high-income elites and a group of lesser-income workers. Clearly, most societies have other cleavages that o¤er a wider menu of identity choices. Moreover, one of these sociocultural distinctions has become increasingly salient in recent elections in the United States and Europe, namely that perceived along ethnic and racial lines. In this section, we extend our model to re ‡ect a population that varies not only in skill level and earnings potential, but also in ethnic or racial background. We ask whether an increase in the perceived cost of identifying with those of a di¤erent race or ethnicity has any bearing on the equilibrium rate of trade protection.
We distinguish two ethnicities in the population, an ethnic majority, M , and the ethnic minority, The economy now produces three goods. Two goods are tradable. An export good, X, and an import-competing good, Z, are produced with constant returns to scale by h and`, much as before.
The export good uses high-skilled labor relatively intensively, whereas the import-competing good uses middle-skilled labor relatively intensively. The third good, S, is a nontraded service. This service is provided by low-skilled workers, with one unit of output per unit of labor. Let p S be the price of the service. Then low-skilled workers earn the competitive wage, w k = p S .
All individuals have quasi-linear preferences and devote residual income after optimal spending on the import good and the nontraded service to the export good. We represent the material well-being of an individual in skill group i by
where (p; p S ) is consumer surplus from combined purchases of the import good and nontraded services and where tari¤ revenues T ( ) now depend on the price of the nontraded service, because demand for the import good Z depends on this price.
Output of the nontraded service is …xed by the supply of low-skilled labor, i.e., Y S = k (where i again is the fraction of individuals with skill level i in the population of size one). Aggregate demand for the service can be derived from the surplus function, namely C S (p; p S ) = @ (p; p S ) =@p S .
Market clearing for services, C S (p; p S ) = Y S , yields a functional relationship between the price of services and the price of the import good. Considering that w k = p S , we can write (with slight abuse of notation) that w k = w k (p), as well as p S = p S (p).
The link between the price of the import good and the wage of low-skilled workers depends on the substitutability or complementarity between Z and S in the typical consumer's demand. If the import good and the nontraded service are gross complements, then an increase in the domestic price of good Z depresses demand for services, which spells a decline in their price and thus a fall in the wage, w k . Alternatively, if good Z and service S are gross substitutes, a rise in the price p induces an increase in w k . 16 We allow for a rich pattern of potential social identities. Individuals with ethnicity j and skill level i may identify with others of their same ethnicity (I j;j i = 1) or not (I j;j i = 0). These same individuals may identify with others in their same social class (I j i;i = 1) or not (I j i;i = 0). And they may identify with a broad group of nationals (I j;n i = 1) or not (I j;n i = 0). 17 The psychological bene…t to an individual from identifying with any group is a linearly increasing function of the material well-being of the prototypical member of the group, where the prototype is the average among individuals with the speci…ed characteristics. That is, the bene…t from identifying with ethnic group j is e P i j i i = j , where e is a constant that is common across ethnicities, j i is the fraction of individuals with skill level i and ethnicity j, and j is the fraction of individuals with ethnicity j in the total population. 18 Similarly, the bene…t from identifying with social class i is i , where is another constant, possibly di¤erent from e . Finally, the bene…t from identifying with the nation is n P i i i . Dissonance costs now have two components. The …rst component is proportional to the squared distance in the space of material well-being, as before. For individuals with skill i who identify with some group g, this cost is ( i g ) 2 , where g is the average material well-being among those with the characteristics associated with group g. The second component is proportional to the squared distance in "ethnic space." Without loss of generality, we assign individuals in the majority an ethnic value of one (E M = 1) and individuals in the minority an ethnic value of zero (E m = 0), so that the distance between them is one. The second component of psychological 1 6 Let consumer surplus be de…ned as
where v ( ) is the utility from consuming the import good and the nontraded service. This function is increasing in each argument and strictly concave. The …rst-order conditions for maximizing consumer surplus require vZ = p and vS = pS, where vJ @ v (cZ ; cS) =cJ , and the concavity of v ( ) ensures that the second-order condition is satis…ed. Di¤erentiating the pair of …rst-order conditions gives @cS=@p = vZS=D, where D = vZZ vSS v 2 ZS > 0: Therefore, an increase in the import price, p, reduces demand for the nontraded service if vZS > 0 and lowers demand for the service if vZS < 0. The price of services, pS, moves in the same direction as the shift in demand, because market clearing for nontraded services requires CS (p; pS) = k . 1 7 It is also possible that the sociocultural environment a¤ords as well the opportunity for individuals to identify with a narrow group de…ned by both class and ethnicity. For example, in the U.S. context, much has been made of late about political trends driven by the "white working class." In our model, the group of individuals with skill level i and ethnicity j is homogeneous, so if social identity groups de…ned by a given combination of class and ethnicity exist and if the status associated with each of them is positive, then everyone would choose to identify with theirs. This would a¤ect the level of trade protection in the initial equilibrium, but would not a¤ect the predicted response to any narrowing of self-identi…cation due to growing ethnic or racial sensitivies. 1 8 Note that all individuals with skill level i achieve the same level of material well-being, independent of their ethnicity. Thus, M i = m i = i for i = h;`; k.
cost for individuals with ethnicity j who identify with some group g is e E j E g 2 , where E g is the average ethnicity among those in group g. Notice that this cost component is zero when an individual identi…es with a group comprised only of others that share the same ethnicity as she.
We are interested in the e¤ects of increases in e on the equilibrium trade policy. Arguably, e has risen in recent years due in part to the e¤orts by some politicians to highlight and amplify the salience of ethnic and racial di¤erences in political discourse.
In the appendix, we display the expression for U (p; q) in the present environment. The political objective, U (p; q), is the sum of material and psychosocial components of utility across individuals with all possible combinations of skill level and ethnicity. Aggregate material utility equals GDP at domestic prices plus tari¤ revenue plus consumer surplus. The status bene…ts from identifying with the nation are proportional to this for all individuals that opt to so identify. The cost combines elements that re ‡ect distance from the average wage in the population and distance from the average ethnicity. For those individuals that identify with their skill group there is an additional psychological gain that is proportional to the sum of that group's wage, tari¤ revenue and consumer surplus and a psychological cost that depends on the ethnic composition of the skill group. For those that identify with their ethnic group, the status bene…t re ‡ects the average material welfare of those with the same ethnicity and the cost re ‡ects the distance of the individual from the ethnic group's average wage. 19 As before, we need to calculate U p (p; q) and examine how the marginal political bene…t from a tari¤ hike responds to changes in e (within an identi…cation regime) and changes in identi…cation patterns (across identi…cation regimes). Note …rst that e multiplies terms that re ‡ect the di¤erence between an individual's own ethnic "value"and that of the average member of a group with whom she identi…es. This di¤erence re ‡ects the ethnic composition of the group in question, but not the domestic price. For example, when an individual with ethnicity j and skill i identi…es with others of her own social class, she bears a dissonance cost of e
denotes the ethnic group that is di¤erent from j. This cost does not vary with p. It follows that @U p (p; q) =@ e = 0 for …xed r, which implies that an increased sensitivity to ethnic di¤erences has no e¤ect on the equilibrium tari¤ unless it induces a change in identi…cation regime. We record this observation in
Suppose that a change in e does not induce a change in identi…cation regime. Then the equilibrium tari¤ rate is not a¤ ected.
An increase in e can generate two types of changes in social identi…cation patterns. First, some individuals with skill level i and ethnicity j might cease to identify with the nation. Second, such individuals might cease to identify with their broad social class, inasmuch as these groups a mix of ethnicities. In either case, the dissonance costs arising due to ethnic diversity are greater for those bearing the group's less-common ethnicity as compared to those with the group's more-common ethnicity, considering that E g = M;g E M + m;g E m = M;g , where j;g is the fraction of those with ethnicity j in group g. 20 This implies that those with the less-common ethnicity in group g will cease to identify with the group before those with the more-common ethnicity, if all else is the same.
As before, we evaluate U p (p ; q)j r=r , where p denotes the equilibrium domestic price in the initial identi…cation regime andr represents the new identi…cation regime. Also, as before, it is helpful to calculate U p (p ; q)j r=r U p (p ; q)j r=r , which is the same as U p (p ; q)j r=r , because U p (p ; q)j r=r = 0 by the …rst-order condition for the optimum tari¤ in the original identi…cation regime, r . Suppose r is any identi…cation regime in which individuals in skill group i with ethnicity j identify with the nation. Letr have the same pattern of identi…cation as in r , except that those with skill i and ethnicity j are induced to no longer identify with the nation; i.e., I j;n i = 1 initially but I j;n i = 0 inr. Then
In the appendix, we identify several scenarios when a group's repudiation of its national identity necessarily generates a jump in the tari¤ rate. One such scenario arises when the importable good Z and the nontraded service S are complements in demand and a group of low-skill workers of either ethnicity ends its identi…cation with the nation. Another arises when the import good and nontraded services are complements and a group of middle-skilled workers whose wage happens to be above the average wage in the economy ends its identi…cation with the nation. In both of these cases, the elimination of concern about the gap between a group's own wage and the national average implies a preference for a higher tari¤. Moreover, when any group no longer receives a psychic boost from the material well-being of the average national, there is less resistance to a distorting tari¤. Then the two terms on the right-hand side of (15) reinforce one another, leading to higher protection. Of course, these are not necessary conditions for a tari¤ hike, and protection can rise in many other circumstances. We highlight, for example, that (p q) 0 (p ) > 0 when p > q, so the …rst term on the right-hand side contributes to higher protection no matter which group repudiates its national identity. Now consider what happens when individuals in skill group i with ethnicity j are induced to no longer identify with their social class due to heightened concern about the diverse ethnic composition of that group. Initially, when r = r , I j i;i = 1. But then, when e rises, the regime switches tor in which I j i;i = 0 but other self-categorizations remain unchanged. Then the direction 2 0 It follows that e E M M;g 2 < e E m M;g 2 , when E M = 1 and E m = 0.
of the jump in policy can be identi…ed from the sign of
Suppose, for example, that low-skill individuals in either ethnic group cease to self-identify as "working poor," a socioeconomic designation that includes low-skilled workers of all ethnicities.
Suppose further that the import good and nontraded services are complements in demand, so that w 0 k (p) < 0. Then the term in the square bracket in (16) can be written as
where the inequality re ‡ects that 0 (p ) < 0 and w 0 h (p ) + w 0 (p ) = Y Z (p ) > 0. 21 It follows that the tari¤ rate jumps upward following such a change in identi…cation regime.
On the other hand, suppose it is middle-skill individuals in some ethnic group that cease to self-identify as "working class." Then the term in the square bracket in (16) becomes
The …rst term in this sum is negative, the second and third terms are positive, and the fourth is positive if the import good and nontraded services are gross complements in demand, and negative otherwise. Evidently, it is not possible to o¤er a clear prediction about the resulting change in trade protection in this case.
We conclude that changes in self-identi…cation that result from heightened sensitivity to ethnic di¤erences can destabilize trade policy, but the nature of the policy response will vary with the economic and political circumstances. The following proposition records our sharpest predictions.
Proposition 7
Suppose that e rises and that the import good Z and nontraded services S are gross complements in demand. If the least-skilled workers of any ethnicity cease to identify with the nation or with their social class, the rate of protection jump upwards. If the middle-skilled workers of any ethnicity cease to identify with the nation and if their wage is at least as great as the economy-wide average, then the rate of protection jumps upward.
In this section, we have shown how the deepening of racial or ethnic divisions in society can lead to changes in trade policies in certain circumstances. If interracial or interethnic tensions intensify, individuals may cease to identify with groups of others that share common socioeconomic attributes but are heterogeneous along these other dimensions. When individuals narrow the purview of their social identi…cation, they may no longer consider the economic standing of the broader group to be a source of pride, nor the income inequality within the group as a source of dissonance. The change in 2 1 Zero pro…ts in the two tradable sectors implies h w h (p)+ `w`( p) = YX (p)+pYZ (p), hence h w 0
their material-plus-psychosocial utility evaluation alters their policy preferences. Thus, switches in social identity that have entirely non-economic roots can generate protectionist political responses when individuals'altruistic preferences extend only so far as the limits of their self-identi…cation.
Conclusion
It has become commonplace to cite the frequent failure of some groups in society to vote their economic self-interests. 22 Many commentators take this observation as evidence of irrational voting behavior. To us, it suggests instead the application of an overly narrow notion of self interest. The self-interest that should guide rational voting should include not only the material aspects of wellbeing, but also psychological elements such as pride, social acceptance, and self-esteem. A rational voter supports policies that will make her most content, which are not necessarily the same as those that will make her most rich.
Social psychologists teach us that contentment and self-esteem come in part from seeing ourselves as members of groups in society. Humans are social creatures. We seek approval from others and covet a sense of belonging. We like to associate ourselves with others whom we respect, taking delight in their successes and sharing discomfort from their failures. It is natural for us to consider the well-being of these others with whom we identify to be a component of our own utility and to support policies that serve them as well as ourselves. Identity politics is the logical result of such thinking.
In this paper, we have adopted the perspective of social identity theory to revisit the political economy of trade policy. We sought to characterize policies that maximize average (or median-voter) welfare in a setting where an individual's assessment of her well-being includes both material and psychosocial components. The material component re ‡ects, as usual, satisfaction from consuming goods and services. Borrowing from social identity theory, we took the psychosocial component as combining two subcomponents, positive feelings derived from pride in the status of groups with which an individual identi…es and a dissonance cost borne from identifying with others that are di¤erent from oneself along meaningful dimensions.
In a familiar trade setting with two goods and two factors, identity politics can give rise to positive tari¤s. Protection need not result from the distributional bene…ts that the less-skilled workers derive from limiting imports to a skill-abundant country. This preference for protection is o¤set in the utilitarian calculus by the opposite predilection on the part of the skilled workers for export promotion. Rather, a bias against trade emerges in political equilibrium when individuals of any skill level identify with a broad group in society that we have termed "the nation." Such individuals may display inequality aversion in their political behavior, not out of a sense of social justice, but sel…shly, because they feel better about themselves when they are not too di¤erent from 2 2 Following the U.S. presidential election in 2016, articles with this theme appeared in Forbes (11/17/16). Politico A de…ning feature of social identity theory is the element of choice; individuals may choose to identify with certain salient groups in society or not. Other people with similar characteristics cannot coerce identi…cation, nor can they exclude it. Inasmuch as identity re ‡ects self-categorization, it can respond to economic and cultural experience. Since identity in ‡uences policy preferences, changes in identi…cation patterns can a¤ect policy outcomes. Moreover, choices of social identity approximate discrete choices; it is more common to think of oneself as being in the in-group or the out-group, rather than being somewhat a part of a group. If identity choices by those with shared characteristics are positively correlated, discrete changes in self-identi…cation at the individual level can go hand in hand with precipitous changes in policy preferences at the aggregate level.
With this possibility in mind, we studied two recent trends in western politics. First, in many western countries, populism has been on the rise. We interpret populism as a form of identity politics whereby the everyman ceases to identify with a broad group of fellow nationals and opts instead to identify more narrowly, i.e., only with other non-elites. In a populist revolution, the elites are seen as corrupt by the working class and no longer a legitimate source of national pride.
In our model, such an event is well captured by a shift in identi…cation by the working class from broad to narrow. It occurs in our model in response to a widening of the income distribution, no matter whether that has been caused by globalization, by technological change, or by some other mechanism. If the elite comprise a small enough minority in the population, a populist revolution of this sort will result in an increased demand for protectionism. It is interesting to note that protectionist sentiments can emerge even if trade is not the primary source of a spread in wages.
Second, many western societies have experienced a heightened sensitivity to racial and ethnic cleavages. In the United States, the Black Lives Matter movement has become a salient identity group advocating on behalf of African Americans. Meanwhile, working class whites, especially males, have become a more potent force in identity politics. In Europe, an in ‡ux of immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Middle East has generated cultural tensions along ethnic and religious lines. In both the American and European cases, identity groups have narrowed along with the perceived de…nition among some sociocultural groups of what it means to be an "American," a "Brit,"a "German"or a "Swede."The connection of this to trade policy in general, and to a rise in protectionist sentiments in particular, is not immediately obvious. By studying a model with two ethnic groups, three goods and three skill levels, we have identi…ed situations where a narrowing of self-identi…cation by certain low-and middle-income groups in society does lead to an increased aggregate demand for tari¤s. More broadly, in a setting of identity politics, shifts in identi…cation patterns that have entirely non-economic causes can a¤ect political preferences and policy outcomes on economic matters.
In order to incorporate social identity into political-economic analysis, we need to make speci…c assumptions. The results from psychological experiments performed to date give us some guidance, but they do not fully resolve all of the relevant questions. The experimental evidence indicates, for example, that individuals gain self-esteem and satisfaction from the status and achievements of the groups with which they identify, but it remains unclear exactly how status and achievement ought to be measured in this context, or how these psychological components compare in magnitude to the direct, materialistic components of utility. Similarly, it is well accepted by now that divergence between one's own attributes and those of fellow group members causes psychological discomfort, but the existing literature does not tell us which di¤erences are most relevant, how they should be measured, and how powerful are these concerns compared to the bene…ts from identi…cation.
In view of the state of our knowledge, we have proposed a ‡exible framework that can be readily re…ned as more evidence of this sort becomes available. To make progress, we have no choice but to take a stand on both reasonable measures of status and of dissonance costs, and our model includes parameters that represent the strength of these respective elements. By doing so, we are able to conduct political-economic analysis of trade policy formation and to identify circumstances under which changes in economic, political and cultural conditions might generate a protectionist backlash. Although the links we describe between social identity and trade policy are hardly de…nitive, it will be misleading if the study of economic policy continues to focus exclusively on aggregate preferences derived only from individuals'own, material interests.
Properties of Wage Functions
The wage functions w h (p) and w`(p) are solved from the pricing equations p = c Z (w h ; w`) ;
where c j (w h ; w`) is the unit cost in sector j. Logarithmic di¤erentiation of these pricing equations yields (see Jones, 1965) :
where ij (p) is the share of input i in the cost of sector j and hX (p) > hZ (p) when the export sector is intensive in more-skilled workers. In the Cobb-Douglas case, these cost shares are constant.
In the Leontief case ij (p) = w i (p) a ij = P k=h;`w k (p) a kj , where a ij are constant input-output coe¢ cients; that is, a ij is the input of workers of type i, i = h;`, needed to produce one unit of good j, j = Z; X. In the Leontief case, w i is a linear function of p for i = h;`, and therefore Evidently, in this case, w 00 i (p) > 0 for i = h;`, because our factor intensity assumption implies w 0 h (p) < 0 and w 0 (p) > 0. Note, however, that the sign of w 00 h (p) can di¤er from the sign of w 00 (p). To illustrate, suppose that in sector j the technology is Leontief while in the other sector it is Cobb-Douglas. Then twice di¤erentiating the pricing equation for sector j yields P i=h;`w 00 i (p) a ij = 0. Since in this case the wage functions are not linear in p, this equation implies that w 00 h (p) has the opposite sign from w 00 (p).
Proof of Proposition 3
Let i be the productivity of labor of type i, i = h;`, the same in the exportable and importcompeting sectors. If, say, h rises from its initial value of one to h = 2, this means that with the new technology a …rm can use half the amount of more-skilled labor to produce the same output as it did with the old technology. Under these circumstances the wage rates are the solution to
Let these solutions bew h (p; h ) andw`(p; `) . Then, using the functions w h (p) and w`(p) from the previous section of the Appendix, which describe the solution of this system when h = `= 1, we obtainw
In other words, an increase in i raises proportionately the wage rate of labor of type i, given the domestic price of imports. These imply:
Now, starting with h = `= 1, consider changes in i of the form
For 0 < 1 this represents less-skilled labor biased technical change, for = 1 it represents Hicksneutral technical change, and for > 1 it represents more-skilled labor biased technical change. We are interested in the impact of these forms of technical change on the equilibrium domestic price, and hence the tari¤ rate.
The …rst-order condition that characterizes the initial equilibrium is given by U p (p ; q; h ; `) j h = `= 1 = 0:
Then
To evaluate the expression on the second line of (19) , note that the …rst-order condition for the equilibrium policy together with (8) yields
Also note from (18) that
and (20), we obtain
It follows that
Using this result and the …rst-order condition (20) we obtain
This proves that Hicks-neutral technical change ( = 1) raises the rate of protection.
We now turn to skilled biased technical change, for which we need to evaluate @ @ h U p (p ; q; h ; `)
Equations (20) and (21) imply 
Now note that
so that the sum of the last two terms exceeds one. Moreover,
:
When this expressions is smaller than one, we have @ @ h U p (p ; q; h ; `)
> 0, and moreskilled labor biased technical change raises the rate of protection. This condition is satis…ed when w 00 h (p ) > 0 and w 00 (p ) 0, which happens when the production functions in both sectors are Cobb-Douglas in form. Note, however, that even if this condition fails, the tari¤ rate may still increase in response to skill bias technical change, because
Proof of Proposition 4
For an interior equilibrium (8) implies that p satis…es We assume that either I n h = 1 or I ǹ = 1 in this equilibrium (that is, some individuals identify with the nation). Under these circumstances the …rst-order condition implies p > q; that is, t > 0. We are interested in the response of t to an improvement in the terms of trade, i.e., to dq < 0.
We can write the …rst order condition for the optimal tari¤ as
where U p [(1 + t ) q; q] is the derivative of U [(1 + t ) q; q] with respect to the …rst argument (i.e., with respect to p), evaluated at t = t . The second-order condition satis…es U pp [(1 + t ) q; q] q < 0.
In this case @t @q
with respect to the second argument.
Note, however, from (8) that
which implies @t @q
Since U pq [(1 + t ) q; q] > 0, the domestic price p is increasing in q. That is, an improvement in the terms of trade leads to a lower domestic price. What we try to …nd out, however, is the tari¤ rate responds to an improvement in the terms of trade. It rises if the expression in (26) is negative and it declines if this expression is positive.
Since 0 (p ) < 0 and U pp (p ; q) < 0, the expression in (26) But the …rst-order condition (24) implies
Substituting this result into the previous inequality then yields
Dividing by (p q) 0 (p ) < 0 yields
The second term on the left-hand side of the inequality is negative, and the third term is negative when 00 (p ) 0 (the latter holds, for example, when the production functions are Leontief in both sectors, because in this case the wage functions are linear in p). In these circumstances, 00 (p ) 0 is a su¢ cient condition for this inequality to be satis…ed. But of course, this inequality can also be satis…ed in many other cases. 23 
Median Voter
We …rst consider the impact of technical change on the rate of protection. Using the factoraugmenting coe¢ cients h and `a nd (13), the marginal impact of an increase in p on U med ( ) can be expressed as : 2 3 Note that in the Leontief case 00 (p ) = 0 and 0 (p ) = C 0 Z (p ), because YZ does not vary with p. Under these circumstances p 00 (p )
; which is the elasticity of the slope of the demand function. If the demand function is concave, then C 00 Z (p ) < 0 and this expression is negative.
From (27) and (17) 
It follows that Hicks-neutral technical change increases the tari¤ rate. Next use (27) and (17) to
The right-hand side is positive for w 00 h (p ) 0. In such circumstances, skilled biased technical change raises the rate of protection. And, like in the case in which the trade policy maximizes aggregate welfare, skill biased technical change can increase the tari¤ rate even when w 00 h (p ) > 0. We now consider the impact of an improvement in the terms of trade, dq < 0, on the rate of protection. The …rst-order condition U med p (p ; q) = 0 implies: @t @q
where U med pq Substituting the …rst-order condition U med p (p ; q) = 0 and (14) into this inequality then yields:
It follows that an improvement in the terms of trade raises the rate of protection if and only if the last inequality is satis…ed. Note that this condition is similar to condition (9) in Proposition 4, the di¤erence being only the weight in front of p 0 (p ) = (p ), which is smaller here. Because p 0 (p ) = (p ) < 0, this inequality is harder to satisfy when the median voter's preferences determine the tari¤ rate.
Ethnic and Racial Identification
We provide here more details for the arguments advanced in Section 7. We begin with the production structure. As before, the price of the export good, X, is normalized to one and the domestic price of the import competing product, Z, is p. The foreign price of Z is q. Goods X and A higher value of e raises the cost of identi…cation in a group of mixed ethnicities. 24 The third line in the expression for U (p; q) represents the contribution to aggregate welfare of the identi…cation of various individuals with others that share their ethnicity. An individual with Evidently, U p (p; q)j r does not depend on the distance in ethnic space and, therefore, changes in e that do not induce changes in identi…cation have no e¤ect on trade policy, as stated in Proposition 6. Now consider an equilibrium with some identi…cation regime r = r in which individuals with skill level i and ethnicity j identify with the nation. Let p be the associated domestic relative price of the import good. Assuming an interior solution, this price is characterized by U p (p ; q)j r=r = 0:
We do not restrict any of the remaining components of the identi…cation regime. Thus, for example, other persons may or may not identify with the nation and may or may not identify with their own ethnic groups. But we do assume that p > q, i.e., that the initial equilibrium has a positive tari¤. This expression is negative if the import competing good and services are gross substitutes in consumption, in which case w 0 k (p ) > 0. But if they are gross complements in consumption, the expression cannot be signed. So, the net e¤ect is ambiguous.
Finally, consider an initial equilibrium with some identi…cation regime r and equilibrium price p in which individuals of ethnicity j and skill level i identify with their own social class; I j i;i = 1. Now suppose that an increase in e leads them to end such identi…cation, but does not a¤ect other self-identity choices. This results in a new identi…cation regime r j i; i and a new policyp . The new policy entails a higher rate protection, if U p (p ; q)j r=r j i; i U p (p ; q)j r=r > 0:
In this case (30) yields: Since (p q) 0 (p ) < 0, the right-side of this equation is positive, implying thatp > p , if
For i = k the expression on the left-hand side of (32) is negative if the import competing product and the nontraded services are gross substitutes in consumption, and the expression on the righthand side of (32) is positive in this case, because it equals Y Z (p ). Under these circumstances, the inequality is satis…ed, which implies that the tari¤ rate jumps up if either the low-skilled workers from the majority ethnic group or from the minority ethnic group cease identifying with others in their social class. For i =`the expression on the left-hand side is positive while the expression on the right-hand side is negative when the import-competing product is a gross complement to the nontraded services, in which case the inequality is violated. So, in this case, we cannot predict whether the tari¤ rate jumps upward or downward. Finally, for i = h, the left-hand side is negative while the right-hand side has one positive term, `w 0 (p ), and one negative term (in the case of gross complementarity), k w 0 k (p ). It follows that we cannot predict the direction of change in the equilibrium tari¤.
